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Materialist and Causal Bridges Over the Explanatory Gap
Celine Geday
Introduction: The Explanatory Gap
The explanatory gap about the subjective nature of conscious
experience is the gap in explanation between conscious experience,
and available scientific explanations of conscious experience. The
explanatory gap is, as Joseph Levine states, the problem that
physicalism (or the physical sciences) has in describing mental terms
and experiences.7 Thomas Nagel also describes the explanatory gap
problem as the problem of explaining the subjective in objective
terms. He states that the subjective viewpoint of the individual is
inherently at odds with an objective, or physical explanation.8
Describing someone’s experience of the redness of red, for example,
by describing the neural mechanisms that fire when he or she sees red
might seem to leave out the phenomenal aspect of experience in
explanation. This is an example of what might be thought of as a gap
in explanation between what the physical sciences say about mental
properties, and what introspection reveals about mental properties.
Describing mental events as identical with brain events is normally
called materialism, which stands in opposition to a dualist, or
non-reductivist treatment of the psychological nature of
mental phenomena.
7
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I offer here some arguments to motivate the materialist side of
the explanatory gap problem. The argument that I believe provides the
greatest impetus for a materialist understanding of mental events is
that of the causal closure of the physical world. I present this
argument through the lens of Jaegwon Kim’s work. The causal
closure of the physical world can be thought of as the completeness of
physical theories, with no epiphenomenal residue supervening on, or
existing

over-and-above

physical

properties.

Epiphenomenal

properties are those that have no causal effect on the world; they are
causally inert. Because they are causally inert, it remains difficult to
see how they can be explained by physically-explainable phenomena,
being nonphysical themselves. The causal closure of the physical
world, I suggest, is best illuminated with respect to the problem of the
gaps in explanations of consciousness through the work of Jaegwon
Kim. This kind of argument is also known in metaphysics as the
"Eleatic Principle" originating from Graham Oddie's work, which in
part, refers to Plato’s Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist. I argue that
theories of qualitative properties must cohere with the causal closure
of the physical world, and so must meet a causal closure condition. I
use the term qualitative properties to refer to the properties of mental
states that can then refer to the character of sensations, which is taken
from Austen Clark.9 Qualitative properties, for Clark, are properties
of sensation that enable the phenomenal appearances of things. 10 On
Clark’s model, sensations enable phenomenal experience, so this term
9

Austen Clark, A Theory of Sentience, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 8,
http://selfpace.uconn.edu/paper/ClarkAusSentient.pdf.
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will be consistent with a materialist description of
subjective experience.
I then offer what I take to be the best materialist account
available that is likely to be compatible with a causal closure
condition. This account is Austen Clark’s feature-placing hypothesis.
Although this account is compatible with Kim’s causal closure, it
does complicate Kim's secondary conclusion from an argument for
causal closure, which is that qualia should be defined functionally, by
the roles that they perform. Feature-placing is at odds with
functionalism because feature-placing defines qualitative properties
relationally, without any direct reference to distal, causal stimuli. Kim
puts forward functionalism as a way of individuating different qualia
uniquely, however Clark’s features themselves are not defined by
their causal role, but relationally. In this way, features and organisms’
abilities to locate them involve no direct reference to distal properties.
Clark suggests that features are relational and not functionally
definable by the distal properties that directly might cause them, and
he bases this idea on two notions. The first is that there is wide
variation across observers, such that reference to a single stimulus that
causes sensation of orange does not account for differences in
observers.11 The second is that there remain problems of individuating
qualitative properties, in reference to stimuli, uniquely for a
functionalist account.12 The idea that one observer might see the color
green for what another person sees as red illustrates the problem, and
11
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this is known as the problem of inverted qualia. Clark argues hence,
that what makes qualitative properties unique cannot be defined by
stimuli,13 but rather by picking out the locations of qualitative
properties in space-time.
Despite Clark’s account being at odds with functionalism, the
feature-placing hypothesis provides a viable demonstration of the
individuation of qualitative properties in another way, which is that of
positing the spatial discrimination capacities of organisms, and these
capacities are enabled by neural functions. He demonstrates that we
have spatial discrimination capacities to pick out the locations of
features. Spatial discrimination capacities are enabled by cortical
maps in the brain, whose information, when bound together by the
subject, allows for the individuation of unique qualia, and allows for
the relational content of qualitative properties themselves to refer to
their locations in space around a perceiver.
Clark also suggests that on the feature-placing hypothesis, sentience is
a primitive stage of perception, within a hierarchy of preattentive
processes leading up to the conscious awareness of an organism.
Clark holds that we have both spatial discrimination capacities, and
capacities to discriminate qualitative properties, or the features of
sensation. These capacities used together serve to individuate the
content of qualia uniquely.
Clark’s account remains compatible with causal closure
because feature-placing individuates qualia uniquely through the
spatial discrimination capacities that organisms possess, and those

13
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capacities are neural functions. This aspect of Clark’s hypothesis is
compatible with the idea that mental properties do not supervene on
physical properties, but rather, are physical processes. This is how
Clark’s account remains compatible with a causal closure condition,
in that the spatial discrimination capacities of perceivers reduce to
properties of brain mechanisms, such as neural feature maps. Feature
maps are cortical maps that guide behavior.[14][15] Clark’s featureplacing hypothesis also remains compatible with causal closure
because it is preattentive- that is, it is an account of early perceptual
processes and thus sensory content on this account, is nonconceptual.
I offer that both Kim's and Clark’s accounts support physical
explanations of qualia and motivate the materialist side of the
explanatory gap.
In conclusion, I offer that Clark’s account of spatial
discrimination and relational qualia is compatible with the causal
closure of the physical world because the processes of feature-placing
are reducible to neural states. I present Kim’s causal closure argument
because I believe it is the strongest motivation for physical
explanations of mental content. I argue that explaining qualitative
properties relationally, and explaining their individuation through
spatial discrimination is the best way to approach the problem of
solving the explanatory gap in that it provides a potential bridge from
consciousness to physical theories that is compatible with naturalism.

14
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Jaegwon Kim and Mental Causation
Jaegwon Kim in his book Physicalism, or Something Near
Enough proposes that mental causation cannot occur unless the
mental is physically reducible.16 Kim offers that the only way to
reduce aspects of consciousness, like sensation to physical states is by
functionally explaining the processes that constitute an individual’s
sensory experiences.17 A functional description of the mechanisms
involved in sensation will iterate the jobs that those mechanisms have
in the system of the organism. For example, on a sort of low-level or
realizer functionalist position, a pain sensation can be described as
being identical with C-fibers firing in in an organism’s nervous
system. In this way, Kim takes an ontological naturalist standpoint in
which there are no immaterial substances in the world like souls, or
immaterial minds.[18][19] This can also be thought of broadly as the
notion that world is composed of physical parts, whatever those parts
may be.
Theories of consciousness for Kim, and thus the causal status
of the mental, need to be based on the causal closure of physical
world.20 The causal closure of the physical world on Kim’s analysis
states that “if a physical event at time t has a cause at t, then it has a

16

Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton & Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2005), 159.
17
Ibid., 172.
18
Ibid., 71, 84.
19
Jaegwon Kim, “From Naturalism to Physicalism: Supervenience Redux,”
Proceeding and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 85 (2011):
113.
20
Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, 156.
100

physical cause at time t.”21 The consequence of Kim’s analysis of
mental causation is that the subjective character of experience loses
its causal effectiveness. Kim states that traditional emergentist, or
supervenience theories (which are non-reductive physicalist theories
about the mental) take the position that the mental is both irreducible
to the physical, and has causal efficacy.22 Kim states that this form of
mind-body supervenience is a way of saving agency and free will. 23
Emergentist and supervenience theories believe the mental to be
irreducible to the physical because consciousness is said to have
intrinsic and ineffable properties.24 However, Kim states that these
theories face the problem of overdetermination.25 In this way, those
theories are incompatible with causal closure. For example, consider
the scenario in which there are two (supposedly) causal properties for
one effect that is physical. If one of the causal properties is physical
and the other is non-physical, in determining which of these caused
the effect, the non-physical property is the property that is first to
become epiphenomenal. This situation demonstrates the workings of
causal overdetermination. If physicalism is taken seriously, then
positing two causes, for one physical effect leaves one of them
epiphenomenal. In the case of the mind-body problem, for Kim,
physical processes would be biological processes, and their effects are
observable behavior.26 Thus, Kim holds that the intrinsic nature of
21
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consciousness is not physically reducible, and therefore, has no causal
effect on the physical world.
However, Kim states that conscious experience can be
characterized functionally, given observable behaviors of conscious
experience.27 Kim suggests that certain parts of the mental are
reducible, such as intentionality, with intentionality referring to
beliefs, desires, and perception.28 For Kim, if the intentional or
cognitive aspects of the mental are functionally definable, there has to
be mechanistic realizers of those functions, even if they are not all
available in immediate scientific research. 29 When Kim describes the
functionalizability of intentionality, he outlines humans’ capacity for
language and the behaviors resulting from communication as an
example of the mechanisms by which belief, thought, and desire can
be realized.30
Kim also suggests that sensory experience, or the qualitative
character of experience, can be expressed functionally. He posits that
this can occur by explaining the similarity and difference relations
between sensory experiences among organisms.31 For example, he
holds that a sensory experience of the sight of a yellow traffic light
produces similar discriminable behavior among individuals using
traffic lights in most cities and towns.32 For Kim, the discriminability
of sensory experiences allows for detectable behavioral differences.
27
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These

behavioral

functionalizable.33

differences,
This

is

he

what

offers,
Kim

are
calls

what

are

“conditional

reductionism.”34 Conditional reductionism means that qualitative
properties are reducible to their functions, or to their causal roles, on
the condition that the behavior caused by sensory experience is
observable. This is to say that the mental realm is reducible, but
intrinsic qualia, is not physically reducible. Kim calls this the mental
residue that is left over after qualia are functionally explained.35
Kim’s account addresses the problems of the non-reductivist
motivations for the explanatory gap. While non-reductive intuitions
coincide with conceptions of intentionality, like thoughts, desires, and
beliefs as being introspectable, and providing individuals with a kind
of agency, Kim demonstrates that the ineffable properties of
subjective experience become epiphenomenal when faced with the
task of explaining how they cause physical behavior. It is important to
consider correlations with behavior and experience as explanatory of
experience, I hold, because this is consistent with revising and
figuring out more exact theoretical explanations of consciousness.
Kim shows how the explanatory gap cannot be bridged by theories
that use non-reductive, and thus epiphenomenal properties to do
explanatory work.
However, materialist theories may not all coincide exactly
with Kim’s causal closure requirements. For example, Clark’s
account complicates Kim’s conclusion that qualia should be defined
33
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functionally, by the roles that they perform, which is a consequence of
his an argument for causal closure. I argue that despite this
complication, Clark’s feature-placing hypothesis is compatible with
the kind of causal closure Kim sets out because on Clark’s account,
qualitative properties remain reducible to physical properties, despite
being relationally defined, and having no relationship to the distal
stimuli that Kim suggests can constitute the discriminable similarity
and differences of intentionality and qualia on a functionalist account.
The physical properties that qualitative properties reduce to, on
Clark’s account, are neural mechanisms such as feature maps and
selective attention processes. Additionally, Clark’s feature-placing
hypothesis offers another way of individuating qualia uniquely, which
is that of the spatial representation of qualitative properties. In these
ways, Clark’s feature-placing hypothesis can be seen as supporting a
materialist explanation of qualitative properties, and suggests
possibilities for bridging the explanatory gap.
Austen Clark’s Feature-Placing Hypothesis
In A Theory of Sentience, Austen Clark calls the mental
representation of a sensory experience, feature-placing. Mental
representation is the idea that when one has experiences, those
experiences are about, or represent something. Feature-placing on
Clark’s account explains qualitative properties relationally via mental
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representation upon which subjects pick out place-times. 36 Placetimes can be thought of as regions or locations in space-time. 37
Picking out place-times is equivalent to having spatial
discrimination abilities, or spatio-temporal-discrimination abilities.
Sentient creatures possess these abilities, which act to indicate the
locations of qualitative properties via the different sensory
modalities.[38][39] Clark offers that locations are picked out through a
causal chain of information, where conditional probabilities between
inputs and outputs determine the information channel. 40 On one end
of this causal chain might be feature maps, discussed more below,
which are cortical regions where cells are activated, and these
processes guide the behavior of the organism.
The feature-placing hypothesis defines the instances of
sensations in a given sensory modality as related to one another,
comparatively. Because the structure of qualitative properties are
defined by their relations to one another on this account, they make no
reference to stimuli or distal properties as objects.[41][42] Clark gives
the example of orange, which cannot have properties that are inherent
to the color itself, but can be known as something that appears as
having the character of being both reddish and yellowish. 43 The
36
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discriminations of similarity and difference relations are among the
properties of sensation that are not intrinsic, phenomenal properties. 44
Rather, Clark holds that the intentional character of the sensations is
nothing over and above its spatial character.
Clark demonstrates that the relational aspect between qualities
can be modeled with existential quantifiers, which highlights how the
features themselves are not defined by their causal role, but rather by
their relations to one another.45 For example, the Ramsey sentence for
red is: Red (x1) ≡ (1)(2)(3)(4)(5) (C12 & M134 & R145 &....) where (x2) is
green, (x3) is yellow, (x4) is orange, and (x5) is blue.46 C stands for the
complements of a particular color, and xy are the color complements.
Mxyz represents terms that stand in a mixing relation; for example,
red and yellow mix to get orange. Rxyz describes qualities more
similar to one color than another. Eventually the sentence can set
equal the properties of brain states to qualitative properties. 47
The

Ramsey

sentence,

Clark

says,

emphasizes

the

interdependent nature of features.48 That is, features would not be
what they are without their relations to one another. For example, the
color red would not be what it is without the other qualities by which
it is defined. In this way, Clark’s account contrasts with functionalist
accounts of qualitative properties. I maintain however, that his
account is still compatible with a causal closure condition because of
its reductive nature. Furthermore, functionalism might not be the only
44
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way to explain qualia and individuate their content. Instead, Clark
holds that spatial representation can achieve both of these aims.
Clark offers that spatial representation acts to instantiate
features at their spatio-temporal locations. He says that distinguishing
the capacities of creatures to represent and discriminate space from
the capacities individuals have to represent the features of sensation
enables us to have the experience of the same quality at two different
locations.49 This distinction aids in both individuating qualia, and
solving the binding problem, or the problem of what allows
ontologically separate features, like red, and square, to appear
together as one cohesive perception. 50 Multiple features can be bound
together in a coherent perception because they are instantiated
together at place-times. Spatial discrimination capacities of perceivers
then pick out the place-times of features.
Clark also holds that feature-placing can be analogous to the
feature-placing languages of P.F. Strawson, where picking out the
locations of qualitative properties can act as a referent, of the
designated term.51 He suggests that a causal chain from the referent to
the designator happens only through perceptual encounters with the
designator, and that spatial discrimination abilities account for
reference.52 In this way, the feature-placing hypothesis presents a

49
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Ibid., 39.
51
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nonconceptual alternative to postulating linguistic contents of
qualitative properties.53
The reductive nature of qualitative properties can be seen
through a creature’s use of neural feature maps. Clark suggests that
cortical regions enable spatial discrimination capacities; areas of the
cortex enable perceivers to discriminate the locations of sensory
qualities.54 Clark holds that the cells of cortical regions corresponding
to the sensory modalities can detect the incidence of basic features.
This then leads to the detection of the location of qualitative
properties. For example, in the auditory modality, detecting
frequencies can enable perceivers to detect distances and other spatial
features.55 The activation of cells in areas of the cortex enables a
causal chain of the primitive detection of qualitative properties. 56
Feature maps, place-coding, and selective attention
The mechanisms in the cortex that detect the locations of
features are called feature maps. Feature maps are topographically
organized and give a sensation a local region of occurrence. 57 For
example, feature maps representing in the visual cortex start with cells
being able to make discriminations of edges, which will also be the
discrimination of the locations of edges. Edges of colors, for example,
are processed at this early stage of perception.[58][59] Processing the
53
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locations of edges comes early in the hierarchy of perception because
the edges are where the discriminable differences lie. This then, leads
to spatial-discrimination abilities.60 Clark holds that feature maps can
represent distal features and their locations, and this is the process of
feature-placing.61
One way of getting from cells firing in the cortex to the
locations of features is through place-coding. Place-coding links the
information in feature maps to information that enables the locations
of qualitative properties to be identified. The way this works is
through the receptive fields of the nerves in a modality. They
correspond to the activation patterns of neurons in the cortex. The
location of receptive fields might correspond to a “pool” of neurons,
as Clark says, that carry information about the location of the
receptive field of the nerves.62 Clark gives an example of locating an
itch: the pools of neurons in the somatosensory cortex correspond to
distinct receptive fields on the skin, so when one pool activates, it
carries information about where its receptive field is, and thus where
the itch is located.63 In this way, the locations of sensation can be
discerned with information from feature maps.
The feature-placing hypothesis sets out to explain only
primitive sensory representation, since the processes feature-placing
accounts for happen in the earliest stages of sensory experience. As
feature-placing processes are the earliest stage of conscious
59
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perception, feature maps that create representations identifying the
incidence of features do not identify objects, or individuate them. 64 In
this way, feature-placing is an unconscious process on the part of
perceivers.65 Clark maintains that following from this, that the
contents of qualitative properties are nonconceptual, and prelinguistic.66 Early-content sensory processes lack object individuation,
and recognition by the sentient individual of such processes. [67][68] For
Clark, perceptual experience occurs in stages, the first of those being
nonconceptual, and pre-attentive, or unconscious.
Accordingly, Clark argues in favor of the spotlight of
attention, or selective-attention model, which is consistent with the
idea that organisms process sensory content preattentively. 69 The
spotlight of attention theory, or selective attention model has it that
the central processing system of a creature selects information from
incoming peripheral processing. That information then falls into the
attention of the organism, or is spotlighted. Clark states, “Selective
attention is thought to be a process that selects some representations

64
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but not others for further ‘central’ processing.”70 Clark iterates that
basic features, on the hierarchical model of perception, are processed
preattentively, and selective attention stands as the transition point
between preattentive stages of perception, and the attentional
awareness stage of perception.71 Features that are being processed
simultaneously and in parallel, on Clark’s account are in a sense, in
competition for selection.72 When they are selected, they surpass preconscious processing into the state in which a subject has awareness
of what she is perceiving.73
The mechanisms of selective attention are also consistent with
content that is processed nonconceptually. Because receptors taking in
preattentive processes cannot be turned off, as Clark says, parallel,
peripheral processes are selected by mechanisms that highlight the
information that eventually becomes conscious.74

In this way,

preattentive processes are those that happen without a subject being
consciously aware of these processes. Selective attention mechanisms
allow for the possibility of distinguishing between the qualia, or the
features themselves, and the awareness one has of perceiving those
qualia.75 During preattentive perception, one is processing the basic
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qualia, while after those features are spotlighted, one can become
aware of what is being perceived.
As this sort of bottom-up processing theory of perception
entails, the feature-placing hypothesis will have it that these processes
eventually lead to the conscious awareness of an organism. However,
feature-placing works in a layered manner, starting with early,
unconscious content, and does not refer to conscious awareness. 76 In
fact, Clark holds that affixing the notion of conscious awareness to all
properties of the mental suggests that creature-consciousness is
consistently subjectively veridical.77 He suggests that this paradigm
creates a bias metaphysics for consciousness in that he states that this
allows for appearances to generate reality.78 He holds that considering
subjective experience to be fundamental gives the mental realm a
metaphysical freedom that does not apply to explanations of
phenomena in the physical sciences. 79
Because the sensory content of feature-placing occurs
nonconceptually, and because qualitative properties can be reduced to
feature maps on Clark’s account, I hold that the feature-placing
hypothesis meets a causal closure condition, and this supports a
materialist account of mental phenomena that can help to bridge the
explanatory gap. The aspect of Clark’s account that defines
qualitative properties relationally, without reference to a physical
cause, or to objects, presents a problem for functional accounts that tie
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explanations of behavior (for example, psychoneural or biological
behavior) to the stimuli that caused the behavior. The motivation for
such an account was seen through the work of Kim, above.
Despite the incompatibility of Clark’s feature-placing hypothesis with
the notion that reference to stimuli allows for a functional description
of behavior, I hold that it remains compatible with a causal closure
condition because qualitative properties, on the feature-placing
hypothesis, are to be reduced to physical properties. Clark’s relational
qualitative properties, and the postulated spatial discrimination
abilities that organisms have to locate and discern those properties,
together, provide a plausible answer to what individuates qualitative
properties. For this reason, I think feature-placing can do work
in providing an explanation that bridges conscious states with
physical properties.
Kim’s account of mental causation and Clark’s account of
feature-placing both suggest that qualia, if it is identified with
intentionality, or conceptual content all-the-way-down will engender
an impossible and impoverished analysis of the ontological nature of
qualia. Clark and Kim seem to agree on one thing: that the intrinsic,
ineffable nature of qualia has no causality in the physical world. [80][81]
Clark’s feature-placing model is one way to achieve and represent the
physicalism-near-enough that Kim puts forward, and that the causal
closure of the physical world requires. In this way, the explanatory
gap might be bridged from a materialist’s perspective because the
sensory properties of mental qualia are explained relationally, and
80
81
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those properties are physically reducible to spatial discrimination
capacities.
Conclusion
Where

Clark’s

feature-placing

hypothesis

addresses

qualitative properties relationally, and identifies and individuates their
content through spatial representation, the account only extends to
primitive sensory content, and so to some advocates of the
explanatory gap, might not address subjective experience completely.
However, I offer here that this is the best characterization of
qualitative properties, in so that they do not become epiphenomenal.
For those who desire a theory of consciousness consistent with the
completeness of physics, or an ontological naturalism, the view that
qualitative properties are intrinsic aspects of subjective experience
will most likely not bridge any gaps in explanation between
consciousness and physicalism because these properties are nonreductive, so it is hard to see how they remain causally effective upon
conscious experience. In this way, the subjective experience of Nagel
and the problems with physicalism in explaining consciousness
suggested by Levine will be epiphenomenal properties of experience,
if the causal closure of the physical world is correct.
Clark’s feature-placing hypothesis fits nicely with an
ontological naturalism and causal closure, and extends the principles
of materialism to concepts about the phenomenal. I offer that Clark’s
feature-placing hypothesis also remains a viable candidate for the
physical reduction of qualitative properties because it allows for
nonconceptual, preattentive content, which bolsters its compatibility
114

with a causal closure condition. This sort of account seems to
provide some kind of bridge in explanation between consciousness
and physicalism.
A psychophysical explanation of sensory experience, (one that
connects perceptual states to the effects of the physical states of
perceivers) such as feature-placing, provides an empirical basis to
build more elaborate and exact theories of conscious experience.
Describing our capacities to pick out features by spatially
discriminating them allows for an objective characterization of “what
it’s like,” as Clark says.82 This approach seems to make room for
further empirical discoveries and hypotheses about qualitative
properties that also aim at bridging the explanatory gap.
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